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By Robert A. Sedler*
Choice of Law
Question 1
A Tenable Approach for Deciding Choice-of-Law Issues
I have long held the view that the interest analysis regimen, as
developed by the late Brainerd Currie,1 is the preferred approach
to resolving conflict of laws because it will provide functionally
sound solutions to the choice-of-law issues that arise in actual
cases. 2 I also maintain that, in practice, the courts that have aban-
doned the traditional approachs generally employ interest analysis
to resolve choice-of-law issues regardless of which "modern" ap-
proach to choice of law they are purportedly following.4 Moreover,
in the case of what Professor Currie terms the "true" conflict-the
situation in which both the forum and the other involved state
each has a real interest in applying its own law in order to imple-
ment the policy reflected in that law-the forum, again regardless
of its purported method for dealing with the true conflict, will gen-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, University of Pittsburgh. J.D.,
1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. Professor Currie's major articles have been collected in B. CURRE, SELECTED EssAYs
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). The basic elements of Professor Currie's approach are
summarized in R. CRAMTON, B. Cumus & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 221-24 (2d ed. 1975).
2. See generally Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler].
3. Florida is the latest state to have abandoned the traditional approach. See Bishop
v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 2315 (Fla. 1980). With this addition, the current
breakdown among the 50 states and the District of Columbia appears to be as follows: 30
states have abandoned the traditional approach, 15 have adhered to the traditional ap-
proach, and 6 have not yet passed on the question. See Sedler, On Choice of Law and the
Great Quest: A Critique of Special Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7
HOFSTRA L. REv. 807, 807 n.1 (1979).
4. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 227-33.
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erally apply its own law.5
The validity of any approach of law must be tested against
the results that it produces in actual litigation. Academic com-
mentators generally agree that the results reached by the courts
when dealing with choice-of-law issues are for the most part func-
tionally sound and fair.' The disagreement is over which approach
the courts should adopt, and the criticism tends to focus much
more on the rationale of the courts' decisions than on the decisions
themselves.' If it is conceded that the courts generally do reach
functionally sound results, and if in practice the courts generally
are employing interest analysis regardless of their formal pro-
nouncements, then the validity of interest analysis as an approach
to choice of law, I would submit, has been empirically
demonstrated.
I have always believed that academic commentators tend to
take an unduly complex view of the choice-of-law process, and this
view sometimes carries over to the courts when they try to provide
a rationale for their choice-of-law decisions.8 Interest analysis has
the effect of simplifying the choice-of-law process by focusing on
5. See id. at 231-33. As this discussion indicates, while the California Supreme Court
purportedly resolves the "true conflict" by looking to the "comparative impairment" of the
states' respective policies, I question how seriously the court engages in "comparative im-
pairment" when California has a real interest in applying its own substantive law. In Bern-
hard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 859 (1976), California clearly had such an interest, and not surprisingly the court con-
cluded that California's policy would be "more impaired" if it were required to yield. It is
highly doubtful whether Nevada would have reached the same conclusion if it had been
using the "comparative impairment" analysis. In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,
22 Cal. 3d 157, 585 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), the California court could afford to
be "generous" in yielding to Louisiana's interest, because it was questionable whether Cali-
fornia law itself would recognize the plaintiffs "unusual and outmoded" substantive claim.
Id. at 165, 168, 583 P.2d at 724, 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870, 874. By yielding to Louisiana's
interest in this "throwaway" case, the California court could appear to be applying "com-
parative impairment" evenhandedly while insuring that California law would apply in the
next case in which the court found that California had a real interest in the application of
its law. See also Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and the Better Law: Grand Illusions
in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 255, 294-300 (1978); Kay, The Use of Compara-
tive Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 586-91 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & CoNTEMp.
PROB. 10 (1977).
7. See, e.g., von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROn. 27 (1977); von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 COR-
NELL L. REV. 927 (1975).
8. Opinions in conflicts cases often tend to be written as if each case were a
"landmark" decision.
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the policies reflected in a state's rules of substantive law.9 This is
the same focus a court must have when dealing with the applica-
tion of a rule of substantive law in a domestic case.
The simplifying effect of interest analysis may explain the
courts' practical preference for its approach. Courts tend to see a
conflicts case as essentially a domestic case with a foreign element
added, and a state's interest in applying its law in order to imple-
ment the policy reflected in that law seems to the courts to be a
rational approach to deciding whether that state's law should be
applied.10 Thus, when the application of the forum's law in the
particular case will not advance the policy reflected in that law,11
and the application of the law of the other involved state will ad-
vance the policy reflected in that state's law, it seems logical to the
court to apply the law of the only interested state.12 Similarly,
when the reasons that call for the application of the forum's law in
a domestic case are equally present in a conflicts case,13 it seems
logical to the forum court to apply its own law. The courts do not
view their function in a conflicts case to be that of "policing the
interstate and international order"14  and are not disposed to
subordinate the policy underlying their own law in favor of sup-
posed "multistate policies. '" 5
It is my contention, therefore, that interest analysis is a tena-
9. According to one of its critics, the "simplicity" of interest analysis is its primary
vice. Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the Horses?, 61 Ky. L.J. 393, 404-12 (1972).
10. It will be recalled that the underlying justification for interest analysis as devel-
oped by Professor Currie was that it would provide rational solutions to choice-of-law
problems. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Laws, 1959 DuKE
L.J. 171, reprinted in SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 177-84 (1963).
11. Totally apart from the choice-of-law context, a court must decide this question
whenever it is determining the reach of the forum's statute to a situation containing a for-
eign element. When the application of the statute to the particular situation will not ad-
vance the statute's policy, the court will hold it inapplicable. See, e.g., People v. One 1953
Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957). In my opinion, Ford Victoria did not
present a choice of law problem. Its result was premised on the California statute's inappli-
cability to out-of-state automobile dealers. See id. at 598, 311 P.2d at 482. See also id. at
599-600, 311 P.2d at 483 (Schauer, J., concurring).
12. In the classical "false conflict," there is general agreement that the court should
apply the law of the only interested state. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 186-87.
13. This is true in the "false conflict" in which the forum is the only interested state
and in the "true conflict." If, for example, the plaintiff is from a recovery state, the interest
of the plaintiff's home state in applying its law allowing recovery is the same irrespective of
where the accident occurs and irrespective of whether the defendant is from a recovery state
or a nonrecovery state.




ble approach for deciding choice-of-law issues because it works. It
simplifies the choice-of-law process by carrying over the considera-
tions applicable to the resolution of domestic cases to the resolu-
tion of conflicts cases. In practice, it is not difficult to apply, and it
produces functionally sound and fair results. While most academic
commentators disagree with the view that in the case of the true
conflict the forum should apply its own law in order to implement
the policies reflected in that law,16 it nevertheless cannot be
demonstrated that the application of the forum's law in the true
conflict produces results that are functionally unsound or funda-
mentally unfair to the parties. 17
So long as interest analysis and the application of the forum's
own law in the case of the true conflict generally produce function-
ally sound and fair results, Professor Currie's version of interest
analysis must indeed be considered the most tenable approach for
deciding choice-of-law issues.
Question 2
The Matter of Identifying Underlying Policies and Interests
I disagree emphatically with the contention that the courts are
not equipped to determine the policies underlying a state's law and
the interest of a state in having its law applied in order to imple-
ment those policies in a particular case. When the court is follow-
ing an interest analysis, particularly as I have reformulated it for
use in the day-to-day process of deciding actual cases,18 the policy
with which it is primarily concerned is the policy embodied in its
own law. This is because the court will apply its own law to imple-
ment that policy whenever it has a real interest is doing so.19 The
court must determine the policy underlying a law when applying it
16. One of the more recent entrants into the fray is Professor McDougal, who proposes
solutions based on "comprehensive interest analysis." See McDougal, Comprehensive Inter-
est Analysis Versus Reformulated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the
Context of Choice-of-Law Problems Concerning Contributory and Comparative Negligence,
26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 439 (1979); McDougal, The New Frontier in Choice of Law-Trans-
State Laws: The Need Demonstrated in Theory and in the Context of Motor Vehicle
Guest-Host Controversies, 53 TuL. L. REv. 731 (1979). Professor Kay, however, has recently
advocated the application of the forum's law in the case of the true conflict. Kay, The Use
of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California
Experience, 68 CALiF. L. REV. 577, 610-14 (1980).
17. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 228-31.
18. See id. at 220-22.
19. See id. at 221.
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in a domestic case, and the process is no different when the court
is deciding upon the law's application to a situation containing a
foreign element.20
The alleged difficulty in determining the policies underlying a
law often results from confusing legislative purpose with legislative
motivation.2 1 The distinction between the two is well understood
by constitutional commentators; generally, legislative motivation is
irrelevant in constitutional analysis,22 while legislative purpose is
central to the determination of a law's constitutionality.2 s If that
distinction were equally well understood by conflicts commenta-
tors, they would recognize that there is no great difficulty in deter-
mining the policies underlying rules of substantive law. 4
Legislative, purpose refers to the objectives that a law is
designed to accomplish, while legislative motivation may be de-
fined as the factors stimulating the enactment of a law. Motivation
may vary between legislators, and there may be mixed motives for
enacting a particular law. Thus, a collective motivation cannot be
ascribed to the legislature, but a collective purpose can be so
20. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Laws, 1959 DuKE
L.J. 171, reprinted in SFmcmD ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
21. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 197.
22. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1968).
23. Legislative purpose identifies the governmental interest that the law is designed to
advance. Constitutional analysis proceeds in terms of the validity of the asserted govern-
mental interest and the relationship between the law's provisions and the advancement of
that interest. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrurioNAL LAw 522-27
(1978).
24. In a recent article, Professor Brilmayer contends that interest analysis is based on
constructive legislative intent, or as she states it, "on a theory that a rational legislature
would, upon reflection, prefer the results of interest analysis to those of competing conflicts
methodologies." Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MicH.
L. R.v. 392, 393 (1980). I strongly dispute this proposition. While Professor Currie did place
a great deal of emphasis on legislative intent, it was in regard to implementing the policies
reflected in particular legislative acts. I do not think it is correct to say, as Professor
Brilmayer does, that interest analysis is based on the theory that the legislature would "pre-
fer the results of interest analysis." Rather, it is that a state's interest in applying its law in
order to implement the policies reflected in that law is a rational way of making choice-of-
law decisions in disputes involving private litigants. Interest analysis is an equally rational
way of making such decisions whether the court is dealing with legislation or judge-made
laws. In any event, there is a clear distinction between determining the policies underlying
rules of substantive law and determining whether the legislature "intended" to have those
rules apply: to particular cases containing a foreign element. Although Professor Brilmayer
contends that "domestic interpretation and conflicts interpretation are different enterprises
altogether," id. at 417, the process in determining the policy underlying a law is the same in
both contexts. How the court makes the choice of law decision once that policy has been
determined is, of course, another matter.
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ascribed. This is done by considering what objectives the law was
designed to accomplish. These objectives can be determined from
the provisions of the law itself, viewed both functionally and in
relation to other laws of the state dealing with the same subject.25
Once the focus is on legislative purpose rather than on legislative
motivation, determining the policies underlying a rule of substan-
tive law is not difficult.
Another reason for the alleged difficulty in determining the
policies underlying a rule of substantive law is the purported ne-
cessity of identifying a single or primary policy that is embodied in
the law. For the purposes of interest analysis, a rule of substantive
law should be presumed to reflect all legitimate policies that it
could possibly serve. When multiple policies are presumed, they
will usually support the same conclusion as to which is the inter-
ested state.26
Thus, if the objectives that the law is designed to accomplish
are examined and if multiple policies are assumed, there will be no
real difficulty in determining the policies underlying that law. In
addition, identifying the policies reflected in one state's rule of
substantive law is also likely to serve to identify the policies of the
state having the opposite rule. Once those policies are deter-
mined, there is little difficulty in determining the interests of the
forum and of the other state in having their laws applied in order
to implement those underlying policies.28
Let us consider a few examples of the matter of identifying
underlying policies and interests. Consider first the guest statute.
Because a guest statute makes it more difficult for a guest-passen-
ger to recover against a host-driver by requiring a showing of
something more than ordinary negligence, it advances the follow-
ing objectives: (1) to give the host some protection from suits by
ungrateful guests; (2) to protect insurers from collusion between
guest-passengers and host-drivers; and (3) to reduce the insurer's
liability for passenger claims. The state interested in applying a
guest statute to implement any or all of these policies is the defen-
dant's home state, which is also the state in which the vehicle is
insured, and the state in which the consequences of mposing lia-
25. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 197-98.
26. Id. at 199-200.
27. Id. at 200-01.
28. Id. at 201-04.
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bility, including the charging of the accident for the purpose of the
insurer's loss, will be felt.2 9 The state that does not have a guest
statute has a policy of allowing all accident victims to recover for
ordinary negligence, including guest-passengers injured by the neg-
ligence of a host-driver. When the accident victim resides in a state
that has not adopted a guest statute, that state has a strong inter-
est in applying its law allowing guest-passengers to recover against
host-drivers for ordinary negligence, because the consequences of
the accident will be felt in the victim's home state. 0
Next, consider the example of a conflict between a rule of
comparative negligence and a rule of contributory negligence. The
policy underlying a rule of comparative negligence is to protect ac-
cident victims by permitting recovery, but reduced in some propor-
tion to the victim's own negligence. A rule of contributory negli-
gence, by contrast, furthers a policy of protecting defendants in
circumstances in which the negligence of the plaintiff contributed
to the accident in any way.31 As in the guest statute situation, if
the plaintiff's home state has a rule of comparative negligence, it
has a real interest in applying that rule, while if the defendant's
home state has a rule of contributory negligence, it has a similar
interest in applying its rule.
Finally, consider the dram shop act situation. The policies un-
derlying a dram shop act are to raise standards of conduct by im-
posing liability for harm caused to third parties by intoxicated pa-
trons and to provide a financially responsible party in the case of
alcohol-related accidents. A state that has not adopted a dram
shop act has a policy of protecting dispensers of alcoholic bever-
ages from this kind of liability. The state in which a dispenser of
alcoholic beverages carries on its activity has a real interest in ap-
plying its dram shop act in order to implement the admonitory
29. Id. at 200.
30. Id. at 202.
31. It could be contended that making contributory negligence a complete bar to tort
recovery also represents an admonitory policy, that is, it is designed to encourage a higher
standard of conduct by completely barring recovery to a party who is even slightly at fault.
In practice, however, the question of whether a contributory negligence rule also represents
an admonitory policy could only arise when the forum is a contributory negligence state and
both the plaintiff and the defendant are from comparative negligence states. If the defen-
dant is a resident of the forum, the forum's real'interest is predicated on enabling the defen-
dant to avoid liability. Such a case is extremely unlikely to arise because in this situation
the plaintiff will almost certainly bring suit in the home state, which will apply its compara-
tive negligence rule. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
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policy reflected in that law.32 The state without a dram shop act
has a similar interest in applying its law in order to protect the
defendant from the imposition of such liability.33 When serving al-
coholic beverages in a state without a dram shop act forseeably can
and in fact does cause harm to a resident of an adjacent state that
has enacted a dram shop act, the latter state has a real interest in
applying its law in order to implement both its admonitory and
compensatory objectives.3 4
The courts generally have had no difficulty in identifying the
policies and interests of the involved states. This experience is the
best answer to the contention that the courts are not equipped to
determine policies underlying a state's law and the interest of a
state in having its law applied in order to implement those policies
in a particular case.
Question 3
False Conflicts, Apparent Conflicts, and True Conflicts
Several years ago, I proposed that the methodology of Profes-
sor Currie's governmental interest approach be reformulated for
more effective use by the courts in the day-to-day process of decid-
ing actual cases.35 Under this reformulation, the forum court's pri-
mary inquiry would be whether it had a real interest in applying
its own law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law. I
see no utility in a court's distinguishing between the false conflict
in which the forum is the only interested state, and the true con-
flict, because in both instances Professor Currie and I advocate the
application of the forum's law. Similarly, once the forum has de-
cided that it does have a real interest in applying its own law, it
has necessarily determined that any conflict between its policy and
interest and that of the other involved state cannot be avoided by
a "more moderate and restrained interpretation" of its own policy
or interest. Only when the forum has concluded that it has no real
32. Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting that the District of
Columbia's strong policy of deterring auto thefts, reflected in a statute requiring the re-
moval of the key from the ignition of a parked car, would be furthered by a rule holding the
owner of a car who violates the statute liable for an intermeddler's negligence).
33. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 318-19, 546 P.2d 719, 721-22, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215, 217-19, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
34. Id. at 318-23, 546 P.2d at 722-25, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219-22. See also Blarney v.
Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1980).
35. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 220-22.
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interest in applying its own law should it be concerned about the
policy and interest of the other state.3 6
In practice, the courts are applying the concept of "real inter-
est,"13 7 as advocated in the reformulation of the governmental in-
terest approach. They have had no difficulty in determining when
the forum does have a real interest in applying its own law in order
to implement the policies reflected in that law, and they have de-
termined the scope of the forum's policy and interest with "re-
straint and moderation."' 8 The concept of "real interest," in my
view, enables the courts to apply interest analysis effectively in the
day to day process of deciding actual conflicts cases.
Question 4
Legislative Solutions
A legislature may be concerned with the application of partic-
ular legislation to situations containing a foreign element, and, if
so, it should impose legislative directives as to when the legislation
should and should not apply." But the utility of legislative efforts
to control choice-of-law decisions generally is most dubious. These
efforts would inevitably take the form of choice-of-law rules and
would suffer the same vice as judicially imposed cholice-of-law
rules.40 The courts that have abandoned the traditional approach
have on the whole reached functionally sound and fair results in
the cases coming before them for decision; thus, there is no need
whatsoever for legislatively imposed solutions in the choice of law
area.
36. Professor Kay disagrees with this aspect of the reformulation that would eliminate
the initial consideration of the policy and interest of the other involved state. Kay, The Use
of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California
Experience, 68 CALu. L. Rav. 577, 613-14 (1980).
37. Sedler, supra note 2, at 221-22. This reformulation would not affect the "unpro-
vided for case," which I maintain should be resolved by a consideration of the common
policies of the involved states. Id. at 233-36.
38. Id. at 222-27.
39. For a discussion of legislative directives regarding the scope of a law's application,
see Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substantive Rules in American Conflicts Law, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 27, 60-61 (1976).
40. For my criticism of a "rules approach," see Sedler, supra note 2, at 208-16.
[Vol. 32
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Jurisdiction
Question 5
The Significance of Recent Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Jurisdiction
I do not think that recent Supreme Court decisions in the area
of jurisdiction "signal a retrenchment" of the Court's view of the
permissible limits for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. The
"minimum contacts and fundamental fairness" test of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington4' has broadened the circumstances
in which a state can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of its interest
in providing a forum for the plaintiff. The decisions in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 42 and Kulko v. Superior
Court45 saw the Court imposing limitations at the outer reaches of
the permissible exercise of jurisdiction. 44 Kulko involved the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over an individual who was sought to be held
subject to suit for increased support payments in California on the
sole ground that, with his acquiescence, his children resided with
their mother in that state. In World-Wide Volkswagen, a retailer
and a regional distributor were sought to be held subject to suit in
Oklahoma on the ground that a vehicle sold by the retailer to a
customer in New York was involved in an accident in Oklahoma.
While the retailer and the distributor were held not subject to suit
in Oklahoma, there was no question that the manufacturer and im-
porter could constitutionally be made subject to suit in the state in
which the accident occurred. So long as there is some "voluntary
and foreseeable" contact between a party and a state, at least of a
commercial nature, there is no doubt that a party can constitution-
ally be made subject to suit in that state for any harm arising out
of that "voluntary and foreseeable" contact.4 We can probably ex-
pect more litigation concerning the outer reaches of the permissi-
41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
43. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
44. One of the reasons why the Supreme Court may be concerned with imposing limi-
tations at the outer reaches of the permissible exercise of jurisdiction is that in a number of
states the courts are directed by statute to exercise jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution," see, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973), and courts
are tending more and more to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum extent constitutionally
permitted.
45. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
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ble exercise of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court is in no way
retreating from the broadening of jurisdiction reflected in the
"minimum contacts and fundamental fairness" test of Interna-
tional Shoe.
Question 6
Stricter Jurisdictional Requirements as a Means of Avoiding
Resolution of Difficult Choice-of-Law Issues
I do not think that in practice there is a strong correlation
between the "difficult" jurisdictional case and the "difficult"
choice-of-law case. In Kulko, there probably was no difference be-
tween New York law and California law on the issue of increased
child support.46 In World-Wide Volkswagen, there was no indica-
tion that the Oklahoma law of products liability was more
favorable to the plaintiff than the New York law. On the other
hand, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,47 there was no question
that Minnesota could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the
Wisconsin insurer, who was doing business in that state, but the
Court was divided over whether Minnesota could constitutionally
apply its own law in deciding the substantive issues of the case.48
The one circumstance in which stricter jurisdictional require-
ments will avoid resolution of a "difficult choice-of-law issue," if
this is how it is perceived, is the accident case presenting a true
conflict, in which there are neither contacts between the plaintiff's
home state and the defendant nor contacts between the transac-
tion and the plaintiff's home state. If the plaintiffs home state had
46. The Court noted that California was a signatory to the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act of 1968, while New York was a party to a similar Act, the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement Act of 1950, as amended. 436 U.S. at 98-99, 99 n.14.
47. 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
48. The Court held by a vote of five to three with Justice Stewart not participating,
that Minnesota could apply its law on the question of whether "stacking" would be permit-
ted in the case of separate insurance policies providing for uninsured motorist coverage. Id.
at 644. The plurality opinion of Justice Brennan found a "sufficient aggregation of contacts"
with Minnesota, based on the insured's regular employment in that state, the insurer's do-
ing business there, and the post-occurrence change of residence by the insured's widow to
Minnesota. Id. at 640-43. Justice Stevens, concurring, found the choice of Minnesota law
consistent with full faith and credit because it did not interfere with any "sovereignty inter-
est" of Wisconsin and consistent with due process, because it was not "fundamentally un-
fair" to the insurer. Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring). The dissenting opinion of Justice
Powell accepted the test formulated by the plurality opinion, id. at 650 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing), but disagreed with its application to the facts of the present case, id. at 652.
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been disposed to exercise the Seider v. Roth49 jurisdictional mech-
anism, suit could be brought in the plaintiff's home state, and that
state could apply its own law, enabling the plaintiff to recover.5
With the invalidation of the Seider v. Roth jurisdictional mecha-
nism in Rush v. Savchuk, 1 this possibility is now foreclosed. If the
defendant is doing business in the plaintiff's home state, however,
suit can be brought there for harm suffered in an out-of-state acci-
dent, and the plaintiff's home state can apply its law allowing
recovery.52
For the most part, then, the cases that present a "difficult"
jurisdictional question will not necessarily present a "difficult"
choice-of-law question, that is, a true conflict between the policy of
the forum and that of the other involved state. So, too, true con-
flicts will be presented in many cases in which there can be no
serious question about the permissibility of the forum's exercise of
jurisdiction, either on the basis of contacts between the forum and
the defendant or between the forum and the transaction." Thus,
the application of stricter jurisdictional requirements as such, is
not likely to have much effect on the avoidance of "difficult"
choice-of-law issues.
Question 7
The Interrelationship of the Policies Underlying the Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law Areas
I believe that the policies underlying the permissible exercise
of jurisdiction and the application of the forum's substantive law
are highly interrelated.5 When the basis for the exercise of juris-
diction is the connection between the underlying transaction and
the forum, that is, the forum is exercising jurisdiction under a
49. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
50. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law:. The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. Rv. 1031, 1036-37
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Consequences].
51. 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
52. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Schwartz v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974). Hague makes it clear that
the plaintiff's home state can apply its law to allow recovery where the plaintiff is injured in
an out-of-state accident having no factual connection with the forum. See notes 56-57 &
accompanying text infra.
53. See, e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Consequences, supra note
50, at 1035-36. -
54. See Consequences, supra note 50, at 1031-34.
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long-arm statute, it is clear that the same factors making it reason-
able, and hence constitutional, for the forum to exercise jurisdic-
tion also make it reasonable, and hence constitutional, for the fo-
rum to apply its substantive law on any of the issues arising in the
case. The classic example of this proposition is the exercise of ju-
risdiction under a tort long-arm statute over an out-of-state manu-
facturer whose product "in the ordinary stream of commerce" finds
its way into the forum state, where it causes injury.55 Because the
manufacturer could foresee that its product, if defectively made,
could cause injury in the forum, under the "minimum contacts and
fundamental fairness" test of International Shoe, the manufac-
turer constitutionally may be made subject to suit in the forum on
a claim arising out of the defect in the product.5 6 For the same
reasons, the forum may apply its own substantive law on any of
the issues arising in the case. 7
The interrelationship between the policies underlying the per-
missible exercise of jurisdiction and the application of the forum's
substantive law is further borne out by the constitutional test for
the application of a state's substantive law that the Court formu-
lated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague. 8 The Court stated:
"[Flor a state's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that state must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."5
This test fully parallels the "minimum contacts and fundamental
fairness" test of International Shoe for the permissible exercise of
judicial jurisdiction.
The Court also made it clear in Hague that under this test the
plaintiff's home state can apply its law to allow recovery when the
plaintiff is injured in an out-of-state accident having no factual
connection with the forum, when it stated that "an automobile ac-
cident need not occur within a particular jurisidiction to be con-
nected to the occurrence. The injury or death of a resident of State
A in State B is a contact of State A with the occurrence in State
55. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 l.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
56. Id.
57. Consequences, supra note 50, at 1032.
58. 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
59. Id. at 640.
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B."60 I have long maintained this positionel and am pleased to see
its endorsement by the Supreme Court. In this situation, jurisdic-
tion generally must be based on contacts between the defendant
and the forum rather than contacts between the forum and the
underlying transaction. 2 However, the defendant's contacts with
the forum, which make reasonable the exercise of jurisdiction on
that basis, are also relevant to make reasonable the application of
that state's substantive law despite the fact that the accident itself
was not connected to the forum.63
Jurisdiction and choice of law, however, are not completely co-
extensive. In some circumstances, jurisdiction may be predicated
on the basis of contacts between the defendant and the forum, but
if the transaction has no connection with the forum and the forum
otherwise has no interest in applying its own law, the application
of the forum's law would be unreasonable and, hence, unconstitu-
tional." Conversely, in certain circumstances it would not be un-
reasonable or fundamentally unfair to apply a state's substantive
law against a particular party, although the party could not be sub-
ject to suit in that state. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen,
if suit had been brought against the retailer and regional distribu-
tor in New York, the application of Oklahoma law on the substan-
tive issues arising in the case would not have been unconstitu-
tional. This is because (1) the accident occurred in Oklahoma, and
(2) as in most accident cases, the defendant did not conform its
conduct to the law of a particular state, so the application of any
other state's law to determine the liability of the defendant would
not be "fundamentally unfair."'65
In summary, the policies underlying jurisdictional and choice-
60. Id. at 641 nn. 19 & 20.
61. See, e.g., Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automo6ile Accidents and the Sig-
nificance of a State Line, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 394, 402-04 (1971).
62. In Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972), however, the forum could have
exercised jurisdiction under a long-arm statute because the trip during which the accident
occurred began in that state and was to terminate there.
63. See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Signifi-
cance of a State Line, 9 DuQ. L. Rav. 394, 406-07 (1971).
64. An example would be when the defendant is a State X corporation that does sub-
stantial business in State Y so as to be subject to jurisdiction there on the basis of contacts
between it and the forum. It is involved in a transaction in State X with a State X resident.
A suit arising from the transaction is brought in State Y. In these circumstances, State Y,
even if it decides to exercise jurisdiction, could not constitutionally (and would not in prac-
tice) apply its own law.
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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of-law principles are interrelated in the sense that, from a constitu-
tional standpoint, due process notions of "fundamental fairness"
impose certain limitations both on the exercise of jurisdiction and
on the application of a state's substantive law. The policies are also
interrelated in the sense that a state's contact with a transaction
may give rise to an interest both in providing a forum for a suit on
that transaction and in applying that state's substantive law to
regulate rights and liabilities arising out of that transaction. The
same factors making it reasonable, hence constitutional, for the fo-
rum to exercise jurisdiction under a long-arm statute also make it
reasonable and hence constitutional, for the forum to apply its
substantive law to the issues in the case. When the sole basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction is the existence of contacts between the
defendant and the forum, however, the absence of contacts be-
tween the forum and the transaction may render the application of
the forum's substantive law to the issues involved unreasonable
and, hence, unconstitutional. Conversely, in certain circumstances
there would be no fundamental unfairness resulting from the ap-
plication of a state's substantive law against a particular party, al-
though that party could not constitutionally be subject to jurisdic-
tion in that state. Very often, however, the permissibility of the
exercise of jurisdiction and the permissibility of the application of
a state's substantive law will be coextensive, and in this sense the
policies underlying the jurisdiction and choice-of-law areas are
interrelated. 6
66. I have previously stated that when a state cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdic-
tion under a long-arm statute, its substantive law also cannot constitutionally be applied to
the transaction. Consequences, supra note 50, at 1032-34. In retrospect, the statement is not
correct, and when it was made it was not consistent with my position that the plaintiff's
home state, assuming that it can otherwise obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, can apply
its law to allow recovery when the plaintiff is injured in an out-of-state accident having no
connection with the forum. See note 61 supra. Similarly, as in World-Wide Volkswagen, so
long as a state could exercise long-arm jurisdiction against some party in the case (there it
was not disputed that Oklahoma could constitutionally exercise long-arm jurisdiction
against the manufacturer and importer of the vehicle), its substantive law could be applied
in a suit against another party who was not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in the state. See
note 64 & accompanying text supra. A correct statement of my position would be that when
a state cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction under a long-arm statute over any party
in the case or over the particular defendant on the basis of contacts between the defendant
and the forum, its substantive law cannot be applied against the defendant in that case. The
earlier statement was formulated with reference to the situation existing in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), in which the Court held that long-arm jurisdiction could not be
exercised against the nonresident directors of a Delaware corporation. My submission is that
the same factors that would make the exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute
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unconstitutional in that case would also render the application of that state's substantive
law unconstitutional as well. I am not sure that the Delaware incorporation of the company,
without more, would constitute a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts
creating state interests" so as to justify the application of Delaware law on the issue of the
directors' liability for breach of their fiduciary duty. If it did, however, I would submit that
there would be no "fundamental unfairness" in subjecting the directors to suit in Delaware
for breach of their fiduciary duty. Consequences, supra note 50, at 1033-34.
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